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Abstract
This paper shows that trade patterns can be crucial in explaining different policy
responses to external shocks, such as the contraction of foreign capital inflows faced by
developing countries since 1982. Based on the hypothesis that the same simple political
economy explains commercial policy in any developing country, Ishow that a particular
country's policy response to a contraction of foreign capital Inflows can be explained as
rational choice urder the assumed general poliey constraint, given the country's
comparative advantages in i oternifnalettrde. The main implication is that, contrary to
common practice in the develemment literature, more attention ,hould be paid to
structural differences, and less to political idiosyncracies, in order to understand policy
behavior in developing contries.

UNDERSTANDING POLICY RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
By Aquiles A. Almansi 1
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show that trade patterns can
be crucial in explaining different policy responses to
external shocks, such as the contraction of net foreign
capital inflows faced by developing countries since 1982.
Recent studies by Balassa(1984,1986) and Sachs(1985)
have provided renewed support to the belief, very popular in
the development literature, that the economic growth of a
developing country facing an external shock is explained
mainly by the country's policy response to it, and not by
the shock's direct effects on the country's economy. In
particular, different commercial policies are credited with
success or failure in preserving economic growth after the
onset of the "debt crisis" in 1982.2 Both Balassa and Sachs
point to the fact that developing countries following
export-promotion policies, like those in East Asia, have
outperformed those following import-substitution policies,
like the Latin American countries.
As discussed by LucasC1986), the empirical connection
between trade policies and economic growth pose a still
unanswered question to the neoclassical theory, where trade
policies are known to affect a country's income level, not
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its rate of income growth. Those who think that compelling
empirical evidence is an acceptable substitute for a
theoretical answer, have to face still another unanswered
question: why some countries do not take advantage of this
empirical evidence when choosing their policies? In the
particular case of the "debt crisis", why did the Latin
American countries choose seemingly self-defeating policies?
In seeking an answer to the latter question,
SachsCi985) emphasizes the need "to understand the political
economy of export promotion in order to understand the
continuing paralysis of the Latin American economies.@" It is
probably the case that many, perhaps most, analysts would
prefer to look for policy errors, or even different sorts of
cultural handicaps to explain the economic performance of
different countries.
The purpose of this paper, accordingly, is to offer an
answer to the policy choice question, based on the
hypothesis that the same simple political economy explains
commercial policy in any type of country. In particular, I
assume that resource allocation decisions are taken under
the constraint that the import-competing sector must be
protected. Furthermore, for reasons that will become
apparent later on, I assume that protection takes the form
of nontariff barriers (NTBs). 3  This assumption about the
nature of protection, which accurately describes actual
commercial policies in developing countries, provides a
common political economy of trade distortions, avoiding the
introduction of ad hoc, idiosyncratic policy processes, and
allows for predictions based on observable characteristics
of each country's economic structure. Under this hypothesis,
I show that a country's particular policy response to a
shock in its foreign financing constraint can be explained
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as an implication of rational choice under the described
policy constraint, given .the country's comparative
advantages in international trade.
The paper is organized as follows. For illustrative
purposes, I describe in section 2 the different patterns of
adjustment to the "debt crisis", which have motivated the
current debate about policy choices. In section 3 I present
the basic model, and discuss optimal adjustment under free
trade. In section 4 I analyze the properties of a
protection-constrained adjustment. Finally, I close the
paper with some concluding remarks in section 5.
2. Patterns of Adjustment
The "debt crisis" of 1982 forced indebted developing
countries to improve their current account balances. As
Table 1 shows for selected cases, the East Asian countries
chose to adjust by expanding both exports and imports, that
is, by increasing their participation in international
trade. On the other hand, Latin American countries chose to
adjust by sharp contraction of their imports, with little or
no increase in exports, that is, by reducing their
participation in international trade. 4
TABLE 1
Since most imports of both the Asian and Latin American
countries are intermediate goods, imports show a high
positive correlation with economic activity. Hence, a
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contraction of imports is associated with a contraction in
economic activity, as it has.been the case in Latin
America.
Is there any meaningful sense in which the different
patterns of adjustment described in Table i can be
characterized respectively as the right and the wrong policy
responses to the same external shock? Table 2 below give us
reasons to believe that the differences in economic
performance between Latin American an East Asian countries
may be entirely unrelated to their respective policy
response to the "debt crisis".
TABLE 2
Given that Latin American countries export mainly primary
products, and that the East Asian countries export
manufactures, their differences seem to be related to much
more general patterns of economic performance, where the
relevant characteristic of a country is its comparative
advantage in international trade. In the remaining of this
paper I show that the different patterns of adjustment
presented in Table I can be explained as an implication of
rational choice under identical policy constraints, given
the country's comparative advantage.
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3. The Model
Consider an economy inhabited by N identical individuals,
who produce and consume cereals, X1, and manufactures, X2 .
Time is divided into discrete periods of equal length. An
individual's preferences over different consumption bundles
in a particular period of time are represented by the
utility function u(c 1 ,c 2 ). The function u is continuous,
strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice
differentiable.
Two different types of inputs are used in the
production process: domestic inputs, z, and imported inputs,
m. The economy has an endowment < of domestic inputs.
Cereals are produced with the technology represented by the
production function X1 Cz i), which requires domestic inputs
only. Manufactures are produced with the technology
represented by the production function X2Cz2 ,m), which
requires both domestic and foreign inputs. The production
functions X1 and X2 are both continuous, strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable.
There are international markets for cereals,
manufactures, and the foreign inputs required by the
manufacturing technology. The economy is small in
international markets, in the sense that it faces given
prices, p1 , p 2 , and p,, for the three types of commodities.
The economy does not have free access to the
international capital market; it is supposed to sustain an
exogenously determined current account surplus, b, in each
period of time.
There are two alternative analytical strategies to
characterize Pareto-optimal resource allocations in this
economy. We can either look at.the Social Planner problem of
maximizing the representative individual's utility subject
to the available technology, endowment of domestic inputs,
and trade opportunities in international markets, or we can
look at the competitive equilibrium of the economy. 5 In this
paper I will follow the latter strategy. For comparative
purposes, and to present some additional concepts that will
be used in the subsequent analysis of protection-constrained
competitive equilibria, I conclude this section by
describing a free trade competitive equilibrium and
discussing how it adjusts to the need of generating a larger
current account surplus.
Define an individual's expenditure function as
eCp 1 ,p 2 ,u)=min pic1+p2 c 2 , with respect to c 1 and c 2 , subject
to u(c 1,c 2 ) u. Given that all individuals are assumed to be
identical, we can write aggregate expenditure in this
economy as E(p,p 2 ,u)=Ne(pi,p 2 ,u).
Let w be the wage rate for domestic inputs. Define a
competitive firm's profit function as irCp 1,p 2 pm,w) = max
p 1 X Cz)+p 2 X2 Cz 2 ,m)-w[z +z 2 ]pm, with respect to z , 2
and m. By well known properties of the profit function, the
firm's demand for labor, z +z 2 , equals -n., i.e., minus the
partial derivative of the profit function with respect to
the wage rate. 6 In order to simplify notation, assume there
is only one firm in this economy, and that it behaves
competitively in the domestic input market. The equilibrium
wage rate is determined by the equilibrium condition
z +z 2 , or ~C4p 1 'p 2 ',p,w)=C,-where t was def'ined to be the
economy's endowment of' domestic resources. Given the f'irm' s
prof'it f'unction, and the equilibrium condition in the
domestic input market, we def'ine the Gross Domestic Product
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function, GCp,,p,), as G=Tn(pi,p2'Ernw) W 4 Pi,Pm2' Pm'
where -n 4 C .,w)=.
Given the constraint imposed by the international
capital market, this economy attains general equilibrium
when ECp1 ,p 2 ,u)+b=GCp,p 2 pm,p3), i.e., when the aggregate
budget constraint is satisfied. By the Pareto-optimality of
a competitive equilibrium, the level of individual welfare,
u, that satisfies this constraint is the maximum achievable
given the representative individual's preferences, the
available endowment of domestic inputs and technology, and
the exogenously imposed current account surplus, b.
Consider now the problem of adjusting this economy to a
new, higher current account surplus b'>b.
At the new equilibrium it must also be true that
ECp1 , p 2 , u')+b'=GCp,p 2 ,pm',), where u'<u. This makes evident
that the adjustment will take place by reducing consumption
of both final goods, Xi and X2, given the negative pure
income effect suffered by each individual, (b-b')/N. There
will be no reallocation of resources because, given
international prices, equilibrium domestic wages will
remain unchanged, as the equilibrium condition still is
-n 4 (pi,p 2 'pm,w)=<. Furthermore, this is true even if the
domestic price structure is distorted by any given set of
taxes or subsidies, or, more generally, any sort of price
distortion, including those imposed on international trade
transactions, like tariffs, export subsidies, etc.
Note that the model's prediction about the nature of
the adjustment is entirely independent of this economy's
patterns of trade with the rest of the world. No matter what
its comparative advantage is, i. e., no matter if this
economy finds it optimal to export cereals or manufactures,
the optimal adjustment to a higher current account surplus
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takes place by simply reducing consumption. It cannot
possibly be optimal to reallocate resources between the two
production activities. In the next section I consider the
case of nontariff protection, where it does become optimal
to reallocate resources, and the optimal reallocation
depends on the economy's patterns of trade.
4. Protection-Constrained Equilibria
Consider now the case where the economy's import competing
sector is granted protection by means of nontariff barriers.
For simplicity, assume that imports of the relevant final
good are prohibited. If an import quota were used, the
analytical results would remain unchanged as long as the
quota is binding for the entire range of current account
surpluses we consider.
If imports of a final good are prohibited, the domestic
price of such a good becomes endogenaus, i.e., determined by
the general equilibrium of the economy. Hereafter, an
endogenous price will be denoted by qh h=1,2.
The general equilibrium of an economy with comparative
advantage in the production of cereals, X1 , can be described
by the following two equilibrium conditions: i)the aggregate
budget constraint is satisfied, and ii)the domestic market
for manufactures is in equilibrium. Formally:
(1) ECpi,q 2 ,u)+b=GCp,q 2,'P,Z'
(2) E2 Cpj,q 2 ,u)=G 2 Cpj'q 2 'Em'Q
where E 2 (.), the partial derivative of' the aggregate
expenditure function with respect to q2 , is the equilibrium
demand ror mnanufactures, and G2 C.), the partial derivative
or the GDP function with respect to q2 , is the equilibrium
supply of' manuractures.
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Similarly, the general equilibrium of an economy
exporting manufactures and. protecting the domestic
production of cereals, can be described by the following
conditions:
(3) E(q 1 ,p 2 ,u)+b=GCq,p 2 ,pQ
C4) E (q , p2,u)=G1 Cq1 ,P2'Y m'
where E1 C.), the partial derivative of the aggregate
expenditure function with respect to q 1 , is the equilibrium
demand for cereals, and G1 (.), the partial derivative of the
GDP function with respect to q 1 , is the equilibrium supply
of cereals.
From (1) and (2), and (3) and (4), it is apparent that
adjustment to a higher current account surplus, b, requires
a reduction in consumption and a reallocation of resources,
both in economies exporting manufactures and in economies
exporting cereals. The resource reallocation is required
because the negative income effect will reduce the domestic
price of the protected good.8 In what follows, I discuss the
resource reallocation required by each trade pattern.
Manufactures Exporters
To analyze resource allocation issues, we have to study the
equilibrium in the two input markets.
When the market for domestic resources attains an
equilibrium, the value of the marginal products of the
domestic resources must equal their wage rate in each
sector. Formally:
(S) q1 X Cz 1 )=p 2 X2Cz 2 , m)=w
Given q1 , and the full employment condition z+zC
the first equation in (5) describes the different
allocations of domestic resources and volume of imports that
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equilibrate the market for domestic resources. Assume that
the pairs Cz2 ,m) that satisfy this equilibrium condition are
those represented by the ZZ curve in Figure 1.9
In equilibrium, it must also be true that the value of
the marginal product of the imported inputs equals its
international price p,. Formally:
(6) p 2 X2(z 2 ,rm)=p
Assume that the pairs (z 2 ,m) that satisfy condition (6) are
those represented by the MM curve in Figure 1.10
FIGURE i
The two input markets attain an equilibrium at point A
in Figure 1, where the ZZ and MM curves intersect. At the
equilibrium point the ZZ curve must be steeper than the MM
curve. This follows from the concavity of the production
functions X1 C.) and X2(.,.)11
Consider now the resource reallocation induced by the
adjustment to a larger current account surplus, b'>b. As we
saw before, this reduces the domestic price of the protected
good, q1 . At the initial resource allocation, a lower q1
implies a lower value for the marginal product of the
domestic resources allocated to the protected sector. From
CS), this requires a shift to the right of the ZZ curve, to
a location like that represented by Z'Z' in Figure 1. From
(6), the MM curve is not affected by the change in q1 .
Hence, the new equilibrium will be at the intersection of
2'2' and MM, point A', which implies a higher level of
imports and a reallocation of domestic resources towards the
production of manufactures, i. e., the exporting sector.
Adjustment clearly produces an increase in the participation
in international trade of manufactures-exporting economies.
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Cereals Exporters
As in the previous case, in equilibrium the following two
conditions must hold:
(7) p X'Cz )=q 2 X
2 cz2 , m)=w
(8) q 2 X2Cz 2 , m)=p
Given q 2  and the full employment condition z£+z 2 =<,
condition (7) is represented by ZZ in Figure 2. Similarly,
given q 2 , condition (8) is represented by MM. The initial
equilibrium is represented by the intersection of ZZ and MM
at point A. 1 2
FIGURE 2
As before, adjustment to a higher current account
balance, b'>b, requires a reduction in the price of the
protected good in this economy, i.e., manufactures. From
(7), a lower q2  requires a shift to the left of the ZZ
curve, which is represented by Z'Z' in Figure 2. In this
case, as is clear from (8), a lower q2 also requires a shift
of the MM curve. Since the lower price reduces the value of
the marginal product of the imported inputs at the initial
resource allocation, the MM curve must shift to the right.
This is represented by M'M'. The new equilibrium is given by
the intersection of the Z'Z' and M'M' curves, at point A'.
This requires both a fall in the employment of domestic
resources in the protected sector, X2 , and in imports.
Hence, cereals exporters adjust by reallocating domestic
resources to the exporting sector and by reducing imports of
the foreign inputs used in the production of manufactures.
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This latter aspect of the adjustment imples that cereals
exporters have weaker incentives than manufactures exporters
to open their economies, if by opening the economy we mean
to increase their participation in international trade.
S. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have shown that noteworthy differences in
adjustment patterns to the same external shock among
different economies .can be explained by optimal decision
making under identical policy constraints.
The particular case discussed here, that of current
account adjustment to lower capital inflows (higher capital
outflows), offers an explanation based on clearly observable
structural differences, and policy similarities, between
Latin American and East Asian countries. Argentina protects
her electronics industry and South Korea protects her
agricultural sector, i.e., both of them protect their import
competing sectors, and the preferred protective instruments
are NTBs. The model predicts that a country like Argentina
should contract her imports and that one like South Korea
should expand hers. And that is precisely what they have
done.
The tendency of exporters of manufactures to adjust by
expanding trade (i.e., by "export-promotion"), cannot be
considered, on a priori grounds, sounder than the tendency
of exporters ot primary products to restrict imports. An
implication of the model presented here is that both are
manifestations ot suboptimal, or constrained-optimal,
behavior. It they were optimizing to begin with, then they
would not want to reallocate resources to adjust to a pure
income shock.1
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The main implication of this paper is that we should
pay more attention to structural differences, and less to
political idiosyncracies, in order to understand policy
behavior in developing countries.
- i3 -
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Footnotes
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University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. Support by the
Ford Foundation for the research program on trade policy at
The University of Michigan is gratefully acknowledged. The
author is most indebted to Robert Stern and Alan Deardorff
for comments received on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 See for example the discussion in Economic Report of the
President, 1986, Chapter 2.
3 This is of course a restrictive assumption. For the
purposes of this paper, however, what is methodologically
important is that we assume the same policy preferences for
every country. The reader unhappy with seemingly arbitrary
assumptions could find consolation in. the fact that NTBs are
indeed widespread, especially in developing countries. For
an analysis of why governments prefer nontariff barriers
see DeardorffC1986).
4 For a detailed description of the Latin American
adjustment since 1982 see L. Sjaastad, A. Almansi, and C.
HurtadoC 1986).
5 Note that we have insured the existence of a competitive
equilibrium by assuming the convexity of the individual's
preferences, the production technology, and the set of
international trade opportunities.
6 See for example DixitC1980), or VarianC1978).
£6 i-
7 Since the economy is a price taker in international
markets, the only market where a single firm could exercise
monopoly power would be the domestic one.
8 From (1) and (2), or (3) and (4), we get du/db= -i/E<0.
From (2) or C4) we get dq /du=Eh /(Ghh- Eh), h=1,2. Hence,
if h is a normal good, dq /db=-CE /EU /(G - Ehh )<0.
9 The ZZ curve has a positive slope given the concavity of
the production functions and the complementarity of Z and M
in the production of X2. Formally:
dm /dz 2 22-( qX 1 z+p 2 X 2 )/p X 2 )O
10 The MM curve has positive slope given the concavity of
X2 (. , . ), and the complementarity of 2 and M. Formally:
dm/dz ' =-X 2 /X 2 >0
2MM= mz um
11 From its definition, the GDP function can be written as
G=max#Cz2 , m), with respect toz2 and m, where the function
# (z 2 , m)=q 1 X 1 Cr-z 2 )+p 2 X2 Cz 2 , m)-pmm. But #C2 2 , m) is the sum of
three concave functions, so it must be concave. Hence, it
must be true that #'z m >0, which is precisely the
condition that the ZZ curve be steeper than the MM curve.
12 The ZZ and MM curves are positively sloped, and ZZ is
steeper than MM at A, for exactly the same reasons explained
above.
13 If there were some true nontraded goods in the model,
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TABLE 2
Real GDP Growth, 1968-85
(in percent)
Predominant
Export 68-77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
Primary
products 5.4 3.5 4.6 4.2 1.1 0.3 -0.4 3.7 3.5
Manufactures 5.7 9.2 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.0 7.4 8.4 6.4










Figure 2: Cereals Exporters
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